Community opposition and infrastructure projects

A major issue with large-scale infrastructure projects, such as highways or rail transit lines, is that frequently they face community opposition. Depending on which side of the fence one sits on a particular project, such opposition can either consist of heroic defenders of community values fighting valiantly against vested interests and the desctruction of their homes and neighborhoods–or of howling bands of NIMBYs putting their own selfish and parochial interests ahead of the Greater Good™. (Even the acronym NIMBY is generally considered a term of abuse). I’ve been on both sides of this particular fence, and so have you, I’m sure.

Three major controversial infrastructure project in the Portland area–one just “suspended” (and likely cancelled, at least for the forseeable future), one which continues full-speed-ahead through the planning process, and one which is already under construction but which has been subject to eleventh-hour attempts to derail it, serve to illustrate the issue quite well.

Controversy abounds

As noted in a prior thread, Portland Mayor Sam Adams announced the suspension of the Lake Oswego Transit Project after a Lake Oswego city council member withdrew his support for the project, placing the projects supporters on the council in the minority. The CRC continues to march towards construction, despite bipartisan opposition to the project, though funding issues may accomplish what community protests have not been able to. And the Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail line is now the subject of a second political challenge from detractors in Clackamas County, as opponents of the project have launched a second challenge to the project, this time an initiative in the city of Milwaukie to block that city’s contribution to the project. A similar measure is also being circulated county-wide, and one county commissioner has suggested renegotiating the contract, already executed, which exists between the county and TriMet, and calls for the county to contribute $25 million to the project.

And a formative event in both the political culture of the region, as well as our transportation infrastructure, were the freeway revolts of the 1970s, which led to the cancellation of the Mount Hood Freeway, as well as several other proposed freeways through Portland neighborhoods–a strike against the alleged Greater Good which was made largely on the grounds that it would have ripped up much of SE Portland.

While I have issues with the cost, I’m generally a supporter of Portland-Milwaukie. I’m on record as opposed to the current CRC, and I’m generally ambivelent to the proposed LO Streetcar. Part of the reason for my ambivelence to the LO Streetcar is that many of the communities along the line–Dunthorpe, Lake Oswego, and even West Linn (which is beyond the line’s terminus, but would be affected by the proposed transit restructuring) seem to be opposed to it. So a good question is: how do I square this with support for PMLR, when it’s frequently alleged that Clackamas County doesn’t want that? (And what of the CRC, which many leaders, particularly in Salem, Olympia, and Washington DC, insist is of crucial to state and national interests, sufficiently so as to override local objections?)

Striking while the iron is hot

A major issue is, of course, timing.

The Lake Oswego Streetcar is still fairly early in the planning phase. Financial commitments haven’t been made, the Final Environmental Impact Statement wasn’t complete (the Draft EIS was, but that’s still early in the process), let alone final design, permitting, and construction started–in short, now is the right time for community objections to be taken into account. And while some of the stated objections may well fit into the “NIMBY” category (particularly from Dunthorpe residents who don’t want streetcars passing by their expensive homes), a key complaint was that the project as proposed would make transit service worse for many users, not better. The design of the line wouldn’t improve either transit times or reliability for Portland-LO trips, and would require a transfer for those coming from beyond Lake Oswego. And the opponents of the project have been, for the most part, those affected by the project.

Given the project didn’t pass the political test, the resources that would have gone to fund it can go to something else. Of course, one key asset for the project–the Willamette Shoreline right-of-way, can’t be moved elsewhere, but there may be other opportunities to use it in the future.

A wrench in the works?

The situation across the river is arguably different. The PMLR project has, for much of its planning and design, enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the relevant government agencies–the city of Milwaukie and Clackamas County. Lower-cost options such as BRT were considered for the project–and Milwaukie officials made it clear that they preferred light rail. The project DEIS was completed in 2008, and the FEIS was published in 2010. Funding has been secured, and construction of the line is already underway. And of particular importance, contracts between TriMet and the county have been negotiated and signed. Yet since the publication of the FEIS in October of 2010, the project has been under assault from within Clackamas County. There was vocal opposition to the project prior to this, but it was mostly unorganized and ineffective.

Thus a good question can be asked of the various petitioners and activists trying to block the project (or at least block the County and City’s contributions thereto)–where were you guys four years ago? Why weren’t anti-LRT petitions being circulated in 2008? Why weren’t city and county officials who supported the project being threatened with electoral challenges back when the scope of the project could have been meaningfully changed? Why are anti-transit activists calling on the County to renege on agreements it has already made?

A couple of possible answers to that question:

  • Prior to 2008, political conservatives were dispirited due to the low public regard for the Bush Administration (and to a larger extent the GOP). After 2008, with the election of Barack Obama, and particularly in 2010, the opposite has been true.
  • The current recession has caused some desire to rethink government spending, with calls for austerity being a major feature of political debate, at least until recently.
  • Various outside interests (with an ideological opposition to transit) seem to have taken a greater interest in the issue, and are encouraging local activism.
  • Rather cynically–there may be bad-faith attempts by some to sabotage the project by attempting to raise last-minute obstacles after the ink is dry on the planning process–in particular by targeting its funding. (Some Clackamas County opponents have suggested truncating the project to Tacoma Street, the first stop north of the county line–a project configuration not contemplated by the FEIS, and one which would thus require an expensive and time-consuming replanning phase to requalify for Federal funding).

Indeed, many of the objections to PMLR seem to be more ideological and funding-related rather than community-based objections. Residents of Oak Grove have expressed concerns about gentriciation, and there have been quite a few snarky references to “crime trains”, as though the primary users of transit are lowlifes; but much of the objection comes from those who don’t live anywhere near the line. Certainly, County voters are entitled to determine where their tax dollars are spent, but again the question must be asked: Where were you when the decisions were being made? (And why wasn’t the Green Line, which was being built at the time and goes much further into Clackamas County than does PMLR, subject to similar levels of opposition)?

The will of the people

Many opponents will retort that they have already answered that question: quite a few will tell you that they were opposing the project front-and-center, but being ignored by elected officials–officials who were busy disregarding (if not outright thwarting) the Will Of The People. The first part about that claim is probably true–the activists against the project have been opposed for quite a while–but the second part is harder to justify. Determing the “will of the people” outside of elections isn’t always easy; and many politicians assume that they have a mandate to do the things that they wish to do once in office, particularly if they campaign and win election on these issues. Politicians who only seek to do what appears to be political popular are routinely derided as weather-vanes and flip floppers, after all, not praised for their commitment to democracy. Activists on all sides of an issue will often claim to represent the will of the people, but knowledgable politicians will tend to disregard such claims until they are backed up by votes. (Or dollars).

And a key point about the will of the people–it changes over time. People may change their minds on issues, priorities may shift due to differing circumstances, people move in and out of different jurisdictions, and people may tune in or out of politics due to various psychological factors. This is a big reason why I asked “what changed” above–prior to 2008, it was liberals who had an enemy to rally and defeat; now it is conservatives who are energized by a bogeyman. Thus it is entirely possible (and I suspect, likely) that the critical mass of opinion in Clackamas County has shifted on the issue. Right now, it seems rather evident that a public opinion in the county as a whole is against the project, as several recent electoral contests have been won by the anti-smart-growth side. But a key thing to remember is that it has shifted–much of this appears to be a recent development. If public opinion was against the project in the latter part of the aughts, it was far less in evidence.

When is late too late?.

So which brings up an interesting question: How much should the political process respect stare decisis–a legal term of art meaning “it’s already decided”? (In law, it refers to the concept that a given issue shouldn’t be adjudicated more than once, without good reason). Is TriMet justified in suggesting it may sue Clackamas County if it tries to back out of prior commitments to PMLR? Were governers such as Chris Christie, Rick Scott, John Kasich, Scott Walker justified in killing off various transit and rail projects in their state, in many cases leaving hundreds of millions of dollars in sunk cost and federal funding, and years of planning, on the table?

Before you answer that, consider: CRC defenders love to point to the hundred million dollars, and advanced state of the public process, as reasons the CRC ought to be built as currently planned, despite significant opposition to those plans on both sides of the river.

And consider the Mt. Hood Freeway.

In the early 1970s, Portland’s freeway plan was about half done. The Fremont and Marquam bridges were complete, as were the Stadium Freeway (I-405), Baldock Freeway (I-5 south of downtown) and Minnesota Street Freeway (I-5 to the north). Much of the East Portland Freeway (I-205) was under construction. (This is in addition to older freeways such as the Banfield and Harbor Drive; which predated the construction boom associated with the Interstate highway system). Next on the list was the Mount Hood Freeway, followed by the St. Helens Freeway and the Rose City Freeway. This plan was a subset of the even more ambitious Portland Improvement plan written by none other than Robert Moses in the 1940s (to say nothing of the proposed freeways designed to support a Portland bid for the 1968 summer games; a bid which did not get far).

The Mount Hood Freeway was, in many was, the crown jewel of the system. West of 92nd, it was to be the intended routing of I-80N (later I-84) into Portland, replacing the functionally-obsolete Banfield Freeway. One part of the proposed highway, a stretch between Gresham and Sandy, was already built. Final designs were in progress, property acquisition had started, and the powerbrokers were all aligned to build it–City Hall, the state highway department, and the feds. Gas was cheap and freeways meant Progress.

But then, neighborhood activists, seeing the destruction brought to neighborhoods like Albina and South Portland by the prior freeways, fought back. Allying with environmentallists, they were able to find a sympathetic audience with the Multnomah County Commission, which was able to delay the project. The 1976 mayor’s race became a referendum on the highway, and the anti-freeway side won. A deal was cut, and the Mount Hood Freeway was cancellled, as were the other highways coming after it. The funding was diverted to build the original MAX line. (But not all was good news–as part of the deal, I-205 was allowed to complete, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes and several East Portland neighborhoods).

Today, hardly anybody laments the millions of dollars spent on designing a project that was never built. The object lesson–inertia, by itself, ought not be an excuse for building a bad project.

So where does that leave us?

So where does that leave us with regard to MLR? Are the same dynamics in play here as were in play along SE Powell Boulevard back in the days of disco?

A couple of differences between the proposed light rail line, and the Mt. Hood Freeway, come to mind:

  • Actual community impact. The Mt. Hood Freeway, were it built, would have resulted in the destruction of hundreds, if not thousands, of homes and businesses. Homeowners would have been reasonably-well compensated, but many business owners, particularly those who don’t own the premises, would have been wiped out by the eminent domain practices in use back then. While the number of condemnations needed for MLR is higher than for prior light-rail lines, it still numbers in the tens rather than the thousands. An eight-lane freeway would leave a scar about 50 yards wide through the neighborhoods it runs through, completely impassable to pedestrians and cross traffic except where overpasses would have been built. A surface light-rail line, on the other hand, is far less disruptive to cross traffic, as the trains only come every several minutes, rather than a continous stream. And electric-powered rail produces zero emissions and little noise; compared to the roar and fumes of a freeway.
  • Rail detractors often point to “increased crime” as a side-effect of transit infrastructure–but this is a charge with little basis in fact, which depends on offensive stereotypes of transit users. These basis of these stereotypes–transit systems predominately used by the poor, and thus afflicted with the pathologies of poverty–aren’t true in Portland anyway, as many middle-class commuters use MAX and the bus.

  • Who benefits?Another big problem with urban freeway construction is that the benefits accrue mostly to those living outside of the city. Someone living near 52nd and Powell isn’t in great need of a shorter ride into town–if Powell is slow, there are plenty of alternate surface streets avaialble; numerous frequent service bus lines serve the neighborhood, and the distance can easily be covered by bike if you prefer. The main beneficiaries are suburban commuters and regional and long-haul traffic. City dwellers, however, bear the brunt of the consequences; it’s their neighborhoods who are ripped up. Urban transit lines, on the other hand, mainly benefit those who live nearby.
  • Source of opposition. Often local fights over community decisions get affected by ideological politics. While much of the opposition to the Mt. Hood Freeway was based on affected neighbors terrified of the bulldozder, the project certainly attracted the attention of environmentalists, who provided local activists with organizational skills, money, and the like. Likewise, Portland’s transit plans have attracted attention from national anti-transit activists, with Americans for Prosperity getting heavily involved in financing and organizing opposition to light rail. In both cases, groups with strong ideological positions (independent of the particulars of a given project) got involved and likely influenced the outcome. Given the short distance that PMLR extends into Clackamas County, however, a good argument can be made that the ideological concerns dominate the discussion.

8 responses to “Community opposition and infrastructure projects”

  1. The cycle of smart growth light rail cronyism continues:

    1. A line is drawn on a map.
    2. A room full of planners and politicians note all of the things they don’t like along that map (single family homes, gas stations, people driving, parking lots, national chain businesses, etc)
    3. A group of well-connected developers puts a stack of cash in an envelope and gives it to the room full of planners and politicians.
    4. The corridor is suddenly declared “blighted”
    5. More planning takes place to try and solve problem. Buzzwords like sustainable and green are thrown around.
    6. The planners come up with a unique solution: Smart-growth and rail transit.
    7. Public meetings are held, usually full of planners, developers, and other “stakeholders.” Those who are against the proposals are quietly dismissed.
    8. Overwhelming public support is declared, evidenced by push polls sponsored by the planners, developers, and politicians who support the projects. Official voting on the matter is deemed unnecessary.
    9. A crafty and creative funding package is created, usually by borrowing lots of money and paying it back with future tax revenue that would normally go to schools and police and/or “free” federal money (thats almost always borrowed as well).
    10. Construction begins in record time. Opponents are told its too late to stop now. Cost overruns are rampant. Opponents are told its too late to stop now.
    11. Rail line is finished. Goldshmidt’s buddies gather for a back patting ceremony. Ridership falls way short of projections. Supporters blame it on the economy and the density along the line.
    12. Massive public subsidies are given to the group of well connected developers to build apartments along the line. Many long standing neighborhoods and businesses are destroyed to make room for the apartments. Buzzwords like sustainable and green are thrown around.
    13. Neighborhood turns into Rockwood. Planners, developers, and politicians move on to another corridor. Meanwhile, homes and businesses are destroyed, bus service is cut, neighborhood character wiped out, and crime and congestion skyrocket.
    14. Area again declared “blighted” and the cycle repeats.

  2. I don’t even know where to begin with that, Anthony…

    Let’s start with Rockwood. Do you have any information for us on the Rockwood neighborhood before 1980? I’m just curious, because all of the MAX lines that have been put in during my lifetime have not created neighborhoods like Rockwood. Perhaps they haven’t had enough time?

  3. Put of curiosity, anthony, in what city or region has the pattern you described occurred? Because it certainly hasn’t happened in these parts yet.

    Numerous elements of the :cycle” (planners and politicians disliking single family homes and people driving, a stack of cash in an envelope, a sudden post hoc designation of a corridor as “blighted”, declarations of overwhelming public support, rampant cost overruns, ridership falling short of projections, destruction of long-standing neighborhoods and businesses to make way for apartments, and skyrocketing crime and congestion) simply have not occurred, at least on a basis regular enough to be considered a “cycle.”

    But go ahead. MAX to Gresham, MAX to Hillsboro, MAX to the Airport, MAX along Interstate, MAX to Clackamas, Portland Streetcar. Go ahead. Show how those projects fit your “cycle.” And since I’m basically calling you out on the facts here, support your cycle with actual evidence that can be confirmed or rebutted, not vague allegations and broad stereotypes.

  4. @anthony, I can’t speak to what planners get up to behind closed doors, but looking at your point #2, I have a hard time imaging smart-growth/transit types having a problem with single-family homes in and of themselves. Sprawling auto-centric suburbs, maybe. But it seems like many smart-growth types hold up the old streetcar suburbs (like the inner east side of Portland) up as positive examples, and those old streetcar suburbs are mainly made up of single-family homes.

    And, “4. The corridor is suddenly declared “blighted,”” sounds more to me like what happened to North Portland before they put in I-5. :)

  5. Declaring something to be “blighted”, levelling existing homes and buildings (throwing out the residents who live there), and then building something else was a common practice throughout the mid-20th century (and was often targeted towards African-American neighborhoods, including in Portland). This was one thing that prompted Jane Jacobs to write The Death and Life of Great American Cities.

    However, the suggestion that this sort of abuse of urban renewal or eminent domain is a key element of MAX development, anywhere, is simply false. Condemnations along the project have been limited to those lots and structures necessary to construct the line and its stations. Likewise, I’m not aware of anyplace in the Portland metro area in the past 30 years (well before MAX opened) where forcible condemnation of property has been used to increase density or otherwise support new-urbanist land use goals.

    Unfortunately, there are some on the political right wing who view upzoning (giving landowners permission to build high-density housing) as coercive, when in fact most zoning regulations (including in the Portland metro area) are designed to limit density, not encourage it.

  6. I say “in the last 30 years” because there were quite a few obnoxious urban renewal abuse(s) in the 1970s and before. (The destruction of a pre-existing South Portland neighborhood to build the Lincoln towers just south of Keller Auditorium was a notorious example). But such projects long predate modern urbanism; and modern urbanists–many of whom are highly influenced by Jacobs–tend to be leary of coercive redevelopment.

    There are exceptions, of course–the Atlantic Yards development in Brooklyn has been widely condemned for the ways it did condemning. But such projects are quite rare compared to the slum-clearing bonanza in the 1950s and 1960s.

  7. This may sound a little nit-picky, but the Mt. Hood Freeway money was not used to build the first MAX line. This had been the intent when the light rail line was being planned, because the original law regarding cancelled urban Interstate segments only allowed the money to be spent on other Interstate segments or on mass transit.

    When the law was changed to allow use of the money for a wider variety of projects, Mark Hatfield obtained Urban Mass Transportation Administration (now FTA) money for the light rail, allowing the Mt. Hood Freeway money to be spent on a variety of highway projects throughout the region.

    It would be correct, however, to say that the availability of the Mt. Hood Freeway money is the biggest reason why the first light rail line was built.

  8. After the regional defeat of South/North (a $400M property tax measure) in 1998 by about 2,000 votes (it was approved by 2/3s majority in Portland), Metro restarted the planning process for the SE Corridor with all options on the table EXCEPT light rail…BRT, ferries, HOV lanes, you name it. Residents of SE Portland and N. Clackamas pushed back hard to get light rail back in the analysis of costs/benefits. The Milwaukie MAX line emerged as the most cost effective option. I am sure someone can post a link to those studies. It has seen process galore, and was it line to be next before Clackamas County commissioners insisted on I-205 line to CTC going first as the Milwaukie line did not go to CTC as it did in the original South/North proposal.
    Note that ODOT also did an extensive study for widening 99E thru SE Portland with HOV lanes; Portland residents killed that idea…not sure of the years, but it was in the 90’s.

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